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Strict Liability Versus Negligence: An Economic 
Analysis of the Law of Libel 
At common law, the publisher of a defamatory statement 
was held strictly liable for any injury inflicted upon the person 
defamed. The plaintiff in a libel action was not required to prove 
negligence. The defendant could defend only by proving that the 
defamatory statement was true or that it came within one of the 
recognized privileges. 
In New York Times Co. v. S ~ l l i v a n , ~  the Supreme Court 
radically altered the common-law rule by holding that strict lia- 
bility for libel was unconstitutional when the person defamed 
was a public official. The Court criticized the strict liability rule 
because "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred 
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true 
and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it 
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do 
SO."' Thus, in order to avoid unduly suppressing the publication 
of defamatory statements, the Court required a defamed public 
official to prove "actual malice" in order to recover damages.' 
The New York Times rule was extended to dl public figures 
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts6 and its companion case, Asso- 
ciated Press v. W ~ l k e r . ~  However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc.,' which was decided ten years after New York Times, the 
Court drew a distinction between public figures and private 
figures and held that a defamed private figure need not prove 
actual malice in order to recover. Strict liability was, however, 
still prohibited. Thus, short of imposing strict liability, the 
states were left free to "define for themselves the appropriate 
standard of liabilit~."~ 
1. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 776-801 (4th ed. 1971). 
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
3. Id. at 279. 
4. Id. at 279-80. "Actual malice" was defined as "knowledge that [the statement] 
was false or . . . reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280. 
5. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
6. Id. (consolidated opinion). 
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
8. Id. at 347. The Court gave two reasons for its decision to treat public figures 
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The Gertz decision emphasized that a proper balance must 
be struck between freedom of speech and "the state interest in 
compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals."@ 
The Court noted that while the actual malice standard of New 
York Times 
administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement 
to media self-censorship of the common-law rule of strict lia- 
bility for libel and slander, . . . it exacts a correspondingly 
high price from the victims of the defamatory falsehood. 
Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally 
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of 
the New York Times test.1° 
Gertz thus reflects the Court's efforts to formulate a liabil- 
ity rule that will not induce an excessive amount of self-censor- 
ship while at the same time not encouraging an excessive 
amount of defamation. The Court concluded that a negligence 
rule best accommodates these competing interests, at least when 
private persons are defamed. 
At a time when many areas of the law are characterized by a 
shift from negligence toward strict liability, a shift in the oppo- 
site direction is a rather curious phenomenon. The Supreme 
Court is apparently convinced that a negligence rule is more 
likely than a strict liability rule to induce publishers to publish 
the "efficient" level of defamation." This Comment will provide 
an economic analysis and comparison of strict liability and negli- 
gence in the peculiar context of libel and will inquire into the 
practical effect of a constitutional preference for negligence over 
strict liability. 
differently than private figures. First, public figures have better access to the media and 
can more easily correct erroneous statements. Secondly, public figures are less deserving 
of recovery because they assume the risk of defamation by injecting themselves into pub- 
lic life. Id. at 344-45. 
9. Id. at 343. 
10. Id. at 342. 
11. If the benefit from reducing the amount of false defamation exceeds the cost of 
doing so, it is efficient to reduce the amount of false defamation. When the amount of 
false defamation can be reduced no further except by excessively inhibiting the publica- 
tion of true defamation, then it is not efficient to further reduce the amount of false 
defamation. 
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A. The Problem of Property Rights 
It is very difficult to acquire and enforce property rights in 
information. Although patent and copyright laws create enforce- 
able rights in some kinds of information, rights in other kinds of 
information are not so well protected. News reporters, for exam- 
ple, cannot effectively enforce property rights in the information 
they gather.12 The first reporter to learn of or report the occur- 
rence of a certain event cannot preclude others from also report- 
ing it as soon as they acquire the information. The inability of 
the news reporter to preclude consumers from purchasing an 
item of information from a competitor means that no reporter 
can appropriate the entire social benefit of that information. 
Thus, the social benefit of the information exceeds its private 
benefit? 
Defamatory statements are merely a special kind of infor- 
mation. Unlike other kinds of information, however, defamation 
can cause great injury. While true defamatory statements convey 
valuable information to those who interact with the person de- 
famed, false defamatory statements injure the person defamed 
as well as those who rely upon the erroneous information." 
Unfortunately, it is often very costly to ascertain truth. A 
publisher is not always certain whether a defamatory statement 
is true or false. In view of this uncertainty, there is always some 
risk that it is false. Thus, false defamatory statements are prop- 
erly viewed as an unavoidable cost of publishing true defama- 
tory statements. It is therefore the goal of the law of libel to 
create a liability rule that will provide publishers with the incen- 
tive to publish the "efficient," or cost-justified, amount of libel. 
Strict liability and negligence have traditionally been the com- 
peting alternatives between which the courts must choose. 
12. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 544 (2d ed. 1977). 
13. Social benefit is the aggregate benefit of the information to society. Private ben- 
efit is the value that a particular publisher derives from publication. 
14. This analysis assumes that true defamation as discerned by judges and juries is 
desirable while false defamation is not, even though true defamation may be more dam- 
aging to the defamed person because it is more likely to be believed. This also appears to 
be the implicit assumption of the Supreme Court in Gertz. Thus, no attempt is made to 
consider the issue whether truth should be determined by courts or by the market. See 
P. POSNER, supra note 12, at 544. 
LIBEL 
B. Incentives Created by Alternative Rules 
1. Strict liability 
If a publisher is strictly liable for the publication of a 
libelous statement, the publisher must either prove the defama- 
tory statement to be true or pay damages to the person de- 
famed." If the cost of proving the truth of a statement exceeds 
the damages caused by the statement, the publisher will choose 
to pay damages. If, however, the cost of damages exceeds the 
cost of proving the truth of the statement, the publisher will 
elect to defend himself by proving the truth. Therefore, the pub- 
lisher who is strictly liable for libel will publish a defamatory 
statement only if the private benefit of publishing the statement 
exceeds the lower of the cost of proving truth or the cost of pay- 
ing damages. 
2. Negligence 
Under a negligence rule, a publisher can avoid both the cost 
of proving truth and the cost of paying damages as long as pub- 
lication is not negligent. Because the goal of a negligence rule is 
to provide an incentive for the publisher to behave efficiently, 
efficiency should be the standard of care by which a publisher's 
conduct is measured. Thus, a publisher should be found negli- 
gent if, and only if, the expected cost to society of avoiding a 
libel is less than the expected damages to society resulting from 
its publication.16 
Assuming that the cost of proving the truth of a defamatory 
statement exceeds the damages caused by the statement,17 the 
only way to avoid libel is not to publish the statement. The cost 
of not publishing a true defamatory statement is the value the 
statement would have had to society had it been published. 
Since, by hypothesis, it is not feasible to determine whether the 
statement is in fact true, the expected cost of avoiding libel is 
15. This assumes that none of the recognized privileges are available as affirmative 
defenses. 
16. An analogous standard of care was articulated by Judge Learned Hand in 
United States v. Carroll Towing co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Posner, A 
Theory Of Negligence, 1 J .  LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
17. Because the cost of proving truth is not affected by the liability rule, it will be 
assumed that the cost of proving truth always exceeds the cost of paying damages. 
Therefore, publishers are assumed to be concerned only with the cost of damages since it 
is even more costly to avoid damages by proving truth. 
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the value to society of the statement if it were true discounted 
by the probability that it is true. The expected damages caused 
by a defamatory statement are measured by the expected cost to 
society of a false statement discounted by the probability that 
the statement is false. 
Under a negligence rule, a publisher will incur the cost of 
damages for libel only if the expected social cost of publication 
exceeds the expected social value. The publisher is thereby en- 
couraged to incorporate social costs and benefits into his own 
private cost benefit analysis in determining what should be pub- 
lished. Thus, defamation should be neither more nor less likely 
to be underproduced than any other kind of information.18 
C. Comparison of Strict Liability with Negligence 
Professor Posner has argued that strict liability and negli- 
gence are both efficient when efficiency requires the producer of 
an injury-causing good to take some action to reduce the amount 
of the injury? This argument assumes, however, that social ben- 
efit equals private benefit. If the producer of the good is strictly 
liable for all injuries caused by the good, but does not appropri- 
ate the entire social benefit of the good, it is quite possible that 
private cost will exceed private benefit even though social bene- 
fits exceed social costs. In that event, the good will not be pro- 
duced even though production would be efficient:O This is pre- 
cisely the problem with defamation which the negligence rule is 
intended to rectify. 
The following table illustrates the publication decisions 
that obtain under strict liability and negligence rules in fifteen 
possible combinations of expected costs and benefits. It is not 
intended to exhaust all the possibilities, but does illustrate the 
more interesting ones. Categories 1-3 illustrate cases where the 
social benefit of publication exceeds the private benefit and the 
18. This does not mean that a negligence rule would result in the publication of the 
efficient amount of defamation. It  would, however, prevent the threat of liability from 
aggravating the problem of inadequately defined property rights in information. 
19. See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973). 
20. It is quite possible that the social cost of false defamation exceeds its cost to the 
person defamed. Thus it is possible that social cost will exceed social benefit but that 
private benefit will exceed private cost. If this occurs the defamation will be published 
even though it is inefficient to do so. This problem might be remedied by givipg a cause 
of action to all those harmed rather than restricting the cause of action to the person 
defamed. It  is not, however, affected by the choice of strict liability or negligence, and 
will not, therefore, be further discussed. 
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social cost equals the private cost. Categories 4-6 illustrate cases 
where social benefit equals private benefit and social cost equals 
private cost. Categories 7-9 illustrate cases where social benefit 
equals private benefit and social cost exceeds private cost. Cate- 
gories 10-15 illustrate cases where social benefit exceeds private 
benefit and social cost exceeds private cost. 
Strict Liability Negligence Efficient 
Bp = Private benefit (value of publication to publisher) 
Cp = Private cost (cost of publication to publisher if held liable) 
Bs = Social benefit (benefit of publication to society) 
Cs = Social cost (cost of publication to society) 
Pt = Probability that statement is true 
* This result is reached because the plaintiff has the burden of proving negligence. 
An examination of the table reveals that neither negligence 
nor strict liability always leads to the efficient outcome. When- 
ever the value of publication to the publisher exceeds the dam- 
ages to the plaintiff, the defamatory statement will be published 
regardless of the liability rule chosen. Since strict liability and 
negligence lead to identical results in these cases, cases 6-9 and 
13-15 are irrelevant in deciding which rule is preferable. 
Having eliminated all cases in which the value to the pub- 
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lisher exceeds the damages to the plaintiff, the only remaining 
cases are those in which a strict liability rule leads to no publica- 
tion. Because a negligence rule will also result in no publication 
where (Pt)(B,) is less than (1-Pt)(Cs), cases 3, 4, and 12 are not 
instructive and can also be ignored. This leaves only cases 1, 2, 
5, 10, and 11 as relevant. 
The differences between strict liability and negligence ob- 
tained in 1, 5, and 10 are attributable to the law's requirement 
that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving negligence. Thus, 
when negligence is not proven, the plaintiff loses. Cases (Pt)(Bs) 
= (1-Pt)(Cs) are likely to be very rare. Furthermore, even when 
they do occur, there is no basis for preferring one liability rule 
over the other. 
In cases 2 and 11, negligence is preferred to strict liability 
because the results obtained with the negligence rule correspond 
to the efficient result, whereas the results obtained under strict 
liability are inefficient. One can thus extract from these cases a 
general rule favoring negligence if, and only if, (Pt)(Bs) is greater 
than (1-Pt)(Cs) and B is less than C,. 
Without the benett of empirical evidence, it is impossible to 
know whether these conditions occur often enough for a negli- 
gence rule to be significantly more efficient than strict liability. 
Nevertheless, it seems quite reasonable to conclude that these 
conditions exist in a significant number of cases and probably in 
most cases. Thus, a perfectly applied negligence rule is probably 
significantly more efficient than strict liability. 
D. Practical Problems 
Under either strict liability or negligence, a publisher will 
publish a defamatory statement only if the expected benefit ex- 
ceeds the expected cost. Negligence is preferred to strict liability 
whenever (Pt)(Bs) (1-Pt)(Cs) and B, < C, only because it per- 
mits the publisher to assume that damages are zero when it is 
economically efficient to do so. However, the publisher can as- 
sume that damages are zero only when the probability of being 
found negligent is also zero. Whenever there is a positive 
probability of being held liable, the publisher will expect to pay 
damages in an amount equal to the total damages discounted by 
the probability of being held liable and modify his publication 
decision accordingly. 
Information regarding social costs and benefits of a defama- 
tory statement is very costly for juries and publishers to obtain. 
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For example, how does one estimate the value to society of 
knowing that an individual is a comm~nis t?~~  An equally diffi- 
cult problem is estimating the probability that a given statement 
is true.22 Given these uncertainties, there will almost certainly be 
a positive probability that the publisher of a defamatory state- 
ment will be held liable despite his best efforts to act non-negli- 
gently. In practice, therefore, the theoretical advantages of a 
negligence rule are mitigated by the uncertainty that results 
from imperfect information. 
This problem is further complicated by the inability of most 
publishers to appropriate the entire social benefit of a publica- 
tion. The injury to a defamed person's reputation often far ex- 
ceeds the benefit the publisher derives from publication. This 
fact, coupled with the positive probability that a publisher will 
be held liable, can result in no publication even when publica- 
tion would be efficient. Assume, for example, that a publisher 
expects to be held liable for libel twenty percent of the time de- 
spite his best efforts to act non-negligently. Assume further that 
the expected private benefit of publication is $1,000, but that 
the damages caused to the defamed person equal $10,000. Be- 
cause the expected private benefit of publication is $1,000, while 
the expected cost is $2,000 (.20 x $10,000), the publisher would 
not publish the statement no matter how great the social benefit 
of publication might be. Assuming a twenty percent chance of 
liability, a defamatory statement will be published only if the 
damages caused the defamed person are less than five times the 
private benefit of publication. Even a very small probability that 
a publisher will be held liable will result in no publication if the 
disparity between private benefit and private cost is very large." 
21. The defamatory publication that gave rise to the litigation in Gertz included a 
statement that Mr. Gertz was a Communist. See Gertz, 418 U.S. a t  326. 
22. The preponderance of the evidence test, generally applied in civil cases, requires 
a jury to determine whether the probability that certain allegations are true is greater or 
less than .5. However, the negligence rule described above requires a jury to be precise in 
estimating the probability that a statement is true. Thus, for example, rather than deter- 
mine whether that probability is greater or less than .5, the jury must determine whether 
it is .2. .4, .7, or .9. It  seems unreasonable to assume that juries can adequately perform 
this task. 
23. If the probability that a publisher will have to pay damages is greater than the 
ratio of private benefit to damages caused the plaintiff, then the publisher will not pub- 
lish the defamatory statement. 
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The inefficiency resulting from the disparity between the 
private benefit and the social benefit of publishing defamatory 
statements is aggravated by a strict liability rule for libel. A neg- 
ligence rule would in theory induce publishers to be more effi- 
cient by immunizing them from liability when the social benefit 
of publication exceeds its social cost. However, since neither ju- 
ries nor publishers can always accurately determine social costs 
and benefits, there will always be a positive probability that a 
publisher will be held liable despite his best efforts to act non- 
negligently. If the probability of being held liable multiplied by 
the expected damages caused to the defamed person exceeds the 
private benefit of publication, then the publisher will not pub- 
lish even though publication would be efficient. Thus, it is quite 
possible that a negligence rule will induce the same behavior as 
strict liability. Empirical studies are the only means of deter- 
mining whether the negligence rule has had an important impact 
on the publication decisions of publishers. 
Gary L. Lee 
